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Abstract. The emerging Federated Edge Learning (FEL) technique
has drawn considerable attention, which not only ensures good machine
learning performance but also solves ”data island” problems caused by
data privacy concerns. However, large-scale FEL still faces following cru-
cial challenges: (i) there lacks a secure and communication-efficient model
training scheme for FEL; (2) there is no scalable and flexible FEL frame-
work for updating local models and global model sharing (trading) man-
agement. To bridge the gaps, we first propose a blockchain-empowered
secure FEL system with a hierarchical blockchain framework consist-
ing of a main chain and subchains. This framework can achieve scal-
able and flexible decentralized FEL by individually manage local model
updates or model sharing records for performance isolation. A Proof-
of-Verifying consensus scheme is then designed to remove low-quality
model updates and manage qualified model updates in a decentralized
and secure manner, thereby achieving secure FEL. To improve commu-
nication efficiency of the blockchain-empowered FEL, a gradient com-
pression scheme is designed to generate sparse but important gradients
to reduce communication overhead without compromising accuracy, and
also further strengthen privacy preservation of training data. The secu-
rity analysis and numerical results indicate that the proposed schemes
can achieve secure, scalable, and communication-efficient decentralized
FEL.
Keywords: Federated Edge Learning; Blockchain; Gradient Compression; Com-
munication Efficiency; Security.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
04
74
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 A
ug
 20
20
1 Introduction
With the rapid advancement of Artificial Intelligence, a larger amount of emerg-
ing applications empowered by machine learning technologies significantly en-
hance the life quality of humans [1]. These applications, such as automatic driv-
ing and smart healthcare, utilize advanced machine learning algorithms to train
different learning tasks on massive user data from various edge nodes, e.g., smart
phones. For traditional machine learning approaches, user data needs to be gath-
ered and centralised in a central server for model training, such as chest CT image
analysis for COVID-19 diagnosis. However, the centralized learning approaches
may bring serious data privacy leakage problems. The growing concerns about
security and privacy of user data have intensified the demand for new solutions.
A promising machine learning technique named Federated Edge Learning (FEL)
is introduced to achieve privacy-preserving model training [2]. In FEL, the edge
nodes collaboratively train a globally shared model by their local data, and only
send their local model updates instead of raw data to a central server [3]. The
central server gathers all the local model updates to generate an updated global
model for the next training iterations.
Despite that FEL has great advantages for AI-based application with require-
ments of data privacy protection, there exist two major challenges for the wide
deployment of FEL as follows: (I) The central server plays an important role
to aggregate local model updates from edge devices and maintain global model
parameters, but is vulnerable to security challenges, e.g., single point of failure.
An unstable central server may result in a system crash. A compromised central
server may generate falsified global model to mislead model training and increase
system resource consumption. (II) There lacks a communication-efficient FEL
framework for scalable model training. In the existing FEL framework, edge de-
vices need to frequently upload a large number of local model parameters to
the central server for model aggregation, which causes excessive communication
overhead and a high demand for network bandwidth [4].
For the security issues of a single central server, previous researchers have
integrated blockchain into federated learning for secure model training [4–6].
Kim et al. presented a public blockchain-based federated learning framework,
in which local model updates are exchanged and verified among miners run-
ning energy-hungry Proof-of-Work consensus algorithms [5]. Instead of public
blockchain, Lu et al. [6] proposed a hybrid blockchain framework with an asyn-
chronous learning scheme for secure and efficient federated learning. Similarly,
Li et al. [4] designed a decentralized federated learning framework using permis-
sioned blockchain. Although blockchain is an effective way to replace the central
server with security guarantee, the process of sharing local model updates among
miners brings data privacy leakage challenges to FEL, which is ignored in the
existing work. Specifically, recent studies have shown that, even only sharing
gradient parameters, a compromised miner may launch inference attack that
infers features of private training data, even the training data of edge devices,
from publicly shared gradients on blockchain [7].
For the communication efficiency issues, the existing study presented new
consensus mechanisms for blockchain-based FEL to reduce communication cost
[4] or developed communication-efficient stochastic gradient descent algorithms
[2], e.g., gradient quantization and encoding [8]. However, the existing schemes
cannot be straightforwardly applied to large-scale FEL because of high communication-
overhead caused by lots of gradients exchanged between edge devices and a cen-
tral server (or miners). The challenges drive the urgent need of developing secure,
decentralized, privacy-preserving and communication-efficient FEL.
To address these challenges, we first propose a Blockchain-empowered Feder-
ated Edge Learning (BFEL) framework without relying on a trusted centralized
server. In BFEL, a consortium blockchain acting as a trusted and decentralized
ledger to manage model updates from edge devices. To filter out malicious or
poisoning model updates, we then propose a Proof-of-Verifying (PoV) consensus
scheme to collaboratively verify the quality of local model updates among pre-
defined miners. Only the verified model updates can be stored into the block for
decentralized federated learning. Since the communication efficiency is signifi-
cantly important for BFEL, we further integrate a gradient compression scheme
into PoV without lowering learning accuracy. This scheme also relieves inference
attack to improve privacy protection of training data.
Moreover, after model training, learning task publishers can share their mod-
els to other entities without enough budget or resources to organize federated
learning. For example, a map company can reuse and trade its traffic-prediction
training model to vehicles for economic benefit. For the sake of security, the
sharing records will be added in the blockchain. However, if both model updates
and model sharing records are stored into a single blockchain, this will result in
larger block size and higher consensus delay. The miners with limited resources
cannot synchronize block data in real time. To avoid this dilemma, we design
further a scalable and flexible framework consisting of a public blockchain as
the main blockchain and multiple consortium blockchains as subchains for per-
formance isolation [9]. Specifically, according to data characteristics and service
demands (e.g., access control), the model updates from edge devices are re-
spectively stored on individual subchains named “Model training subchains”.
Meanwhile, the model sharing records between the task publishers and other
entities are stored in a subchain named “Model trading subchain”.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
– Unlike single blockchain-based systems, we design a hierarchical blockchain
framework with a main blockchain and multiple subchains to manage model
updates and model sharing records in a secure, scalable and flexible manner.
– For model training subchains, we design a PoV consensus scheme to filter
out unreliable model updates by allowing miners to collaboratively verify
the quality of model updates for secure BFEL.
– We propose a gradient compression scheme to improve the communication
efficiency of BFEL without compromising learning accuracy, and also to
enhance privacy preservation by mitigating inference attacks.
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Fig. 1. The proposed federated edge learning framework with multi-blockchain.
2 Scalable Blockchain Framework for Decentralized FEL
2.1 Multi-blockchains for Secure Federated Edge Learning
As shown in Fig. 1, the considered federated edge learning system includes an
application layer and a blockchain layer. In the application layer, each task pub-
lisher, e.g., a map company, sets a learning task (e.g., traffic prediction) and
sends the collaborative machine learning request to nearby wireless communica-
tion infrastructures, e.g., RoadSide Units (RSUs) in vehicular networks or base
stations in cellular networks (Step a in Fig. 1) [3, 10]. These infrastructures
broadcast the learning task to edge devices with suitable data (e.g., vehicles
or smart phones). Legitimate edge devices can join in a task group and act as
workers to train the learning task on their local datasets (Step b). Each dataset
is generated from personal applications (e.g., navigation services) or collected
from surroundings (e.g., sensors on vehicles). Each worker trains a given global
model from its task publisher, and generates local model updates (Steps c, d, e).
Considering large communication overhead of transmitting local model updates
to miners, a gradient compression scheme is performed to transform the model
updates into compressed model updates with sparse gradients (more details are
given in Section 4). Here, the miners can be pre-selected RSUs or base stations
to establish a consortium blockchain called “Model training subchain”. Next, the
workers upload their compressed model updates to the miners for model quality
evaluation. After executing Proof-of-Verifying (PoV) consensus scheme (intro-
duced in Section 3), the qualified model updates are included into a new block
and stored in a model training subchain (Step f ). Finally, the workers download
the latest block data and calculate a new global model for the next iterations till
meeting the accuracy requirements of the task publisher. The final global model
is sent back to the task publisher, and the task publisher rewards the workers
according to their contributions [3]. Furthermore, after training, task publishers
with high-quality global models can act as model sellers to trade their models
with model buyers (e.g., drivers) without sufficient cooperating workers or train-
ing budget. The model trading records are recorded in a consortium blockchain
named “Model trading subchain” for secure storage (Steps g, h).
In the blockchain layer, blockchains play a significant role in the federated
edge learning to provide secure, traceable, tamper-proof data storage (i.e., model
updates and trading records), which removes the control from a centralized server
suffering from security and privacy challenges. However, traditional blockchain
systems based on a single blockchain are not practical and scalable for large-
scale FEL because of limited throughput, long consensus delay, and large block
size. Miners in a single blockchain are often overloaded because of constrained
resources. Moreover, block data from different services or purposes, e.g., model
training and model trading records, should be set different access permission for
different entities, and is stored in isolation to protect data privacy [9]. To this
end, we propose a multi-blockchain system including consortium blockchain-
based subchains and a public blockchain-based main chain.
Specifically, by treating model updates as “transactions” between workers
and task publishers, local model updates of workers and workers’ contributions
are securely stored in their corresponding model training subchains [9]. Each sub-
chain is only accessible for a task publisher and its participating workers. Mean-
while, to enable secure and reliable model trading, the model trading records
should be kept as tamper-proof records in the model trading subchain. Only the
task publishers and their model buyers can access and obtain block data in this
subchain. For different subchains, miners are randomly chosen from communica-
tion infrastructures with sufficient computation and storage resources to execute
efficient consensus algorithms (e.g., DPoS and PBFT), respectively. These min-
ers will be changed after each consensus round to reduce the effects of possible
collusion among the miners. The miner selection schemes are out of scope here,
but can refer to related work in [11].
To efficiently monitor all subchains and miner behaviors, all the subchains
should be anchored to the main chain after a time interval for effective gov-
ernance. To solve the trust problem among blockchains, the block data in the
individual subchains can be easily verified by following the notary mechanism
in [9,12]. The main chain periodically stores the Merkle tree root of the block data
from different subchains, not the original bock data on the subchains for privacy
protection and saving storage resources. This means that the main chain only
manages and maintains network addresses of model updates and model trading
records. The model buyers can search global models by the latest block data in
the main chain, and thus send trading requests to finish the model trading. In
short, compared with traditional single blockchain-based systems, the proposed
framework can achieve: i) data privacy protection by setting access permission
on individual subchains and ii) performance isolation through individual con-
sensus algorithms. Each individual subchain maintains its own data locally, and
all the subchains are anchored to the main blockchain periodically for publicly
verifiable integrity of subchains as well as ensuring scalability and flexibility.
2.2 Attack Model for Federated Edge Learning
Although federated learning can solve data privacy issues to a certain extent,
it is subject to new security threats, such as: i) poisoning attack and ii) infer-
ence attack. For poisoning attack, malicious edge devices may intentionally send
malicious, poisonous or low-quality model updates to poison the global model,
thus misleading model training process and increasing the probability of incor-
rect learning results [3]. The poisoning attacks degrade the accuracy of learning
tasks, increase the convergence time of the global model, and the probability of
erroneous learning results. For inference attack, recent studies have shown that a
compromised central server (i.e., parameter server) can infer underlying training
data by analyzing shared local gradients from edge devices when using gradient-
based reconstruction. This intrudes the data privacy of edge devices illegally and
silently [7, 13]. This attack is becoming more serious because more entities may
obtain shared gradients in blockchain-based federated learning systems. There-
fore, it is important to defend against the poisoning attack and inference attack
for secure and privacy-enhanced federated edge learning [3, 7].
3 Proof-of-Verifying Consensus Scheme for Training
Subchain
In this paper, inspired by the Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) consensus al-
gorithm, we propose an efficient consensus scheme named Proof-of-Verifying
(PoV) that integrates model updates and quality evaluation into the consensus
process, which can defend against poisoning attacks and achieve secure model
update and storage. The main steps involved in PoT are as follows.
– Step 1: Initialization: We adopt an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
and asymmetric cryptography for communication initialization in the sys-
tem. A Global Trust Authority (GTA) joins in the proposed PoV to perform
identity verification and key manager. Each legitimate entity generates pub-
lic & private keys and corresponding certificates for information encryption
and decryption after passing GTA’s checking.
– Step 2: Miner joining: Communication infrastructures send joining requests
and submit their resource and identity-related information to the GTA. The
GTA will verify the validity of the communication infrastructures based on
records of historical behaviors. Only legitimate, reliable and resource-rich
communication infrastructures can be miner candidates to establish sub-
chains. The workers vote for their miner candidates. The candidates with
high votes are chosen as delegates and join into a miner group with a ran-
domly selected leader and other miners acting as verifiers. The verifiers will
execute quality evaluation of local model updates (described in Step 3).
Meanwhile, the leader miner is responsible for aggregating all qualified local
model updates and generating pending block. After each round of consensus,
for the sake of safety, the leader and the verifiers will be changed randomly.
Similar to DPoS, all miners should submit a deposit to a shared account
under public supervision. If a miner has malicious behaviors during PoV
consensus process or causes damage to the global model, the blockchain sys-
tem will confiscate the deposit and remove the miner.
– Step 3: Quality evaluation of local model updates: After finishing a local
model training process, each worker (i.e., participating edge device) exe-
cutes the gradient compression scheme to generate compressed local model
updates. More details about the gradient compression scheme are given in
Section 4. Then the worker sends its compressed model update to the nearest
miner on the corresponding model training subchain. This miner (i.e., veri-
fier) first evaluates the quality of the compressed model updates from nearby
workers by using a testing dataset. This small testing dataset is verified and
provided by the task publisher in each model training subchain, which is
considered as a reliable dataset for verifying the training model. Only the
qualified model updates, whose accuracy is higher than a given threshold, are
picked up to store in a pending block later. The thresholds can be adjusted
according to security requirements of different task publishers. In this way,
the model evaluation can prevent poisoning attacks incurred by malicious
participants, thus improving security of the proposed BFEL framework. [4].
– Step 4: Consensus process: For mutual monitoring, the verifiers broadcast
their model updates and verification results with signatures to each other
for double-checking. Each verifier then compares the verification results with
those of other miners, and sends the comparison results as a response to
current leader miner for aggregation. The response includes qualified model
updates, comparison results, a digital signature, and timestamp. The leader
receives all the qualified local model updates and verifier responses, thus
put them into a pending block and broadcasts this pending block to all
verifiers. If and only if more than 23 of verifiers agree on the pending block
of this round of model updates, this block data will be added into the model
training subchain and synchronized among the all the miners.
– Step 5: Updating training model: All the workers download the new block
data from their corresponding subchains, and calculate the average of all
qualified local model updates as their new global models, respectively. The
workers will use the new global model for the next training iteration.
4 Gradient Compression Scheme for Communication-
efficient BFEL
In blockchain-empowered federated edge learning, workers need to send a large
amount of gradient information (i.e., local model update parameters) to miners
for aggregating model updates in each training iteration. The workers not only
bear large communication overhead, but also suffer from the inference attack
when sharing gradients. However, previous studies have shown that the sparse-
ness degree of gradient is generally high, so only a few important gradients (i.e.,
gradients with large absolute values) have a positive effect on the accuracy of the
model [13]. Inspired by this, we propose a gradient compression scheme to achieve
communication-efficient and secure BFEL. Here, only the important gradients
(with large absolute values) are uploaded to the miners to reduce the commu-
nication overhead. The importance of a gradient is indicated by its magnitude.
Only the gradients, whose absolute values are larger than a given threshold, are
transmitted. To maintain model performance, the gradient compression scheme
utilizes the techniques of momentum correction and local gradient clipping on
top of the gradient sparsification to ensure no loss of accuracy [7]. As a result,
the gradient compression scheme not only reduces communication bandwidth
problems by gradient sparsification (i.e., compressing the gradients), but also
relieves the inference attack problems by only sharing limited gradient informa-
tion [7, 13].
More specifically, the workers only send a part of gradients with large abso-
lute values to their miners. To avoid information loss caused by gradient spar-
sification, the rest of gradients are stored in local buffer space of workers, and
accumulated locally till becoming large enough to be uploaded [7]. Here, we use
distributed stochastic gradient descent for iterative updates, and define the loss
function to be optimized as follows [7, 14]:
F (ω) =
1
Dk
∑
x∈Dk
f(x, ω), (1)
ωt+1 = ωt − η 1
Nb
N∑
k=1
∑
x∈Bk,t
∇f (x, ωt) , (2)
where F (ω) is the loss function, f(x, ω) is the loss calculated from data sample
x ∈ Dk for workers, and ω is the weight of the neural network. The learning rate
is denoted as η, and Bk,t is a sequence of N mini-batches sampled from Dk for
the t-th round of training (1 ≤ k < N), and b is size of each local data sample.
Note that the model convergence time will be affected when the sparsifi-
cation degree of gradients reaches a large value, e.g., 99% [7]. To address the
convergence problem, we employ a momentum correction mechanism proposed
in [7,14] to mitigate this effect. Using the momentum correction mechanism, the
accumulated small gradients for each worker converge toward the direction of the
gradients with a larger absolute value, thus accelerating the model convergence
speed. Moreover, we also apply gradient clipping mechanism to overcome gra-
dient explosion. Specifically, by following [14], the gradient clipping is executed
locally before adding current gradients to the previous local gradient accumula-
tion, thus the gradient explosion problem is alleviated [14,15].
We prove the gradient compression scheme has no impact on the model con-
vergence as follows [14]. We define g(i) as the i-th gradient, and u(i) is the sum
of the gradients using the optimization algorithm in [2]. v(i) represents the sum
of the gradients accumulated in local buffer space, and m is the ratio of the re-
maining gradients to all gradients. If the i-th gradient does not exceed threshold
until the (t− 1)-th iteration and triggers the model update, we have:
u
(i)
t−1 = m
t−2g(i)1 + · · ·+mg(i)t−2 + g(i)t−1, (3)
v
(i)
t−1 =
(
1 + · · ·+mt−2) g(i)1 + · · ·+ (1 +m)g(i)t−2 + g(i)t−1, (4)
thus we can update ω
(i)
t = w
(i)
1 − η × v(i)t−1 and set v(i)t−1 = 0. If the i-th gradient
is larger than the threshold at the t-th iteration, model update is triggered, then
we have:
u
(i)
t = m
t−1g(i)1 + · · ·+mg(i)t−1 + g(i)t , (5)
v
(i)
t = m
t−1g(i)1 + · · ·+mg(i)t−1 + g(i)t . (6)
Next, we can obtain,
ω
(i)
t+1 = ω
(i)
t − η × v(i)t = ω1(i) − η ×
[(
1 + · · ·+mt−1) g(i)1 + · · ·+ (1 +m)g(i)t−1 + g(i)t ]
= w
(i)
1 − η × v(i)t−1.
(7)
Therefore, the result of using the local gradient accumulation is consistent with
the usage effect of the optimization algorithm in [2]. The detailed implementation
of the gradient compression scheme is given in Algorithm 1 with the following
phases:
– Phase 1: Local Model Training: The workers train their local models
on their own local datasets with momentum correction and local gradient
clipping mechanisms. These mechanisms can solve the learning convergence
and gradient explosion problems, respectively.
– Phase 2: Gradient Compression: Each worker executes the gradient
compression process in Algorithm 1 to compress the gradients and upload
sparse gradients (i.e., only the gradients whose absolute values larger
than a threshold are transmitted) to the nearby miner. Note that the
workers send the remaining local gradients in their buffer space to the nearby
miner when the local gradient accumulation is greater than the threshold.
– Phase 3: Gradient Aggregation: The miner verifies and aggregates sparse
gradients from local workers. Finally, the qualified gradients from all workers
are put into a block, and then both the miners and the workers can obtain
a new global model from the new block data in their corresponding model
training subchains.
5 Security Analysis and Numerical Results
5.1 Security Analysis
Blockchain-related Issues: The proposed decentralized federated learning
framework with multi-blockchains is secure and reliable due to the following
Algorithm 1: Gradient compression scheme.
Input: A set of workers N = {n1, n2, · · · , ni}, B is the local mini-batch size, Dk
is the local dataset, η is the learning rate, and the optimization function
SGD.
Output: ω.
1 Initialize ωt;
2 gk ← 0;
3 for t = 0, 1, · · · do
4 gkt ← gkt−1;
5 for i = 1, 2, · · · do
6 Sample data x from Dk;
7 gkt ← gkt + 1NB∇f(x;ωt);
8 if Gradient Clipping then
9 gkt ← Local Gradient Clipping (gkt );
10 foreach g
kj
t ∈ {gkt } and j = 1, 2, · · · do
11 Thr← |Top ρ% of {gkt }|;
12 if |gkjt |> Thr then
13 Send this gradient to the nearby miner;
14 Send the remaining gradients to the buffer space of the worker;
15 else if When accumulated local gradient > Thr then
16 Send this gradient to the nearby miner;
17 All-reduce gkt : gt ←
∑N
k=1
(sparse g˜kt );
18 ωt+1 ← SGD (ωt, gt).
19 return ω.
reasons: (I) The proposed BFEL framework can defend against traditional se-
curity attacks by standard cryptographic methods including asymmetric and
symmetric key-based encryption, and digital signature schemes. (II) The hierar-
chical blockchain framework provides flexible authority control. The consortium
blockchain-based subchains are established on authorized infrastructures with
different access permissions according to security requirements and configura-
tion. The model training subchains are isolated based on different federated
learning tasks. Only authorized edge devices and miners can access their corre-
sponding model training subchains. The model trading subchain is accessible for
model buyers and sellers. The main chain based on public blockchain is open ac-
cess for all the entities to check and monitor model training records and model
training information. This framework enables performance isolation that each
individual subchain maintains its own data locally without privacy concerns. All
the subchains are anchored to the main blockchain periodically for publicly ver-
ifiable integrity of subchains. (III) Similar to the DPoS consensus algorithm, the
proposed Proof-of-Verifying scheme is secure and reliable as long as the number
of malicious miners does not exceed 13 of the total number of miners [4]. The
malicious miners will be punished and their deposit confiscated (mentioned in
Step 2 of the PoV consensus scheme), which deters the malicious behaviors of
miners. (IV) The local model update records and model training records are
secure because of tamper-proof, decentralization and traceability properties of
blockchain technologies [16–18].
Federated Learning-related Issues: With the help of PoV consensus scheme,
both the local model updates and global model updates are reliable and secure
for federated edge learning. The reason is that, for the i-th round of local model
updates, miners will mutually verify the quality of the local model updates us-
ing a given testing dataset, and remove poisonous local model updates that may
damage the global model. Only the high-quality model updates are added into
model training subchains to generate a new and reliable global model for the
next iteration. Therefore, the PoV consensus scheme can defend against poison-
ing attacks and ensure secure decentralized federated edge learning. Moreover,
the gradients from workers contains the distribution of local training data. For
inference attacks, the attackers analyze this distribution information and recon-
struct the training data according to shared gradients by reverse engineering [7].
Thereby, we can utilize the gradient compression scheme to generate sparse gra-
dients, and upload these gradients to the miners without compromising learning
accuracy. Using this approach, we can prevent the attackers from obtaining the
complete distribution of local training data, which can reduce gradient privacy
issues during decentralized model learning. As a result, the gradient compres-
sion scheme not only improves the communication efficiency of BFEL, but also
relieves inference attacks caused by gradient leakage problems.
5.2 Numerical Results
We evaluate the performance of the proposed BFEL framework and schemes
by using real-world datasets including MNIST and CIFAR-10. The datasets are
uniformly divided into a training set including 70% data and the rest data is
included in a test set. We implement the proposed BFEL framework using Py-
torch, PySyft, and a blockchain platform named EOSIO with DPoS scheme [3].
The experiment is conducted on a virtual workstation with the Ubuntu 18.04
operating system, Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-4500U CPU, 16GB RAM, 512GB SSD.
There exist 2 task publishers, 22 miners, 20 workers, and also a model trading
subchain and 2 model training subchains in the simulation. All of the subchains
apply the DPoS scheme as their consensus algorithms.
In our Blockchain-based Federated Edge Learning (BFEL) framework, the
gradient compression scheme plays an important role for system performance.
We first evaluate effects of a hyperparameter ρ (i.e., the threshold of gradient
absolute value in Algorithm 1) for the BFEL. A simple Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) network (i.e., CNN with 2 convolutional layers followed by 1
fully connected layer) is used to perform the classification tasks on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets, respectively. The pixels in all datasets are normalized into
range of [0,1]. In the simulation, we take a model training subchain with 10
workers and 11 miners as an example. The learning rate is η = 0.001, and the
training epoch is E = 1000. The mini-batch size is B = 128, and θ is set as 0.05.
We compare the performance of different ρ thresholds for the learning accuracy,
and thus find out the best threshold of the gradient compression scheme in our
simulation.
Specifically, ρ takes value from the set {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.9, 1, 100} to carry
out simulation on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets to observe the best thresh-
old of the gradient compression scheme. As shown in Fig. 2, we observe that the
larger ρ leads to the better accuracy performance of the proposed framework.
For the MNIST task, the results demonstrate that the accuracy is 97.25% when
ρ = 0.3, and the accuracy is 99.08% when ρ = 100. This means that although the
gradient size has been raised more than 300 times as compared with ρ = 0.3, the
learning accuracy is only improved 1.83% than that of ρ = 0.3. Furthermore, we
observe a trade-off between the gradient threshold and accuracy. Therefore, to
achieve the trade-off between the gradient threshold and the learning accuracy,
we set ρ = 0.3 as the best threshold of the gradient compression scheme.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of communication ef-
ficiency in different scenarios and models.
For the communication efficiency of the BFEL framework, we compare the
BFEL framework with the Gradient Compression Scheme (GCS) with the tradi-
tional centralized FEL framework with or without GCS. We apply typical CNN,
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), Gate Recurrent Unit (GRU), CNN-LSTM,
and Support Machine Vector (SVM) methods with an identical simulation con-
figuration. For these methods, CNN is running on MNIST dataset to execute
an image classification task, and the rest of methods are running on a power
demand dataset with time series data to perform power consumption prediction
task [19]. The gradient threshold ρ of the GCS is set as 0.3. Similar to DPoS
in EOSIO platform, the consensus time of PoV scheme in each round is set as
0.5 seconds for the BEFL framework [20]. Considering the communication over-
head of each round as a fixed value, we compare the running time of the above
methods in three scenarios (i.e., BFEL with GCS, FEL with or without GCS) to
indicate the communication efficiency. As shown in Fig. 3, we observe that the
running time of FEL framework with GCS is less 50% than that of FEL without
GCS. The reason is that GCS can reduce the number of gradients exchanged
between the workers and the cloud aggregator. Since there exists delay caused
by PoV scheme in BFEL, the running time of BFEL framework with GCS in
different scenarios is higher than that of FEL with GCS, but much lower than
that of FEL without GCS. Moreover, the BFEL framework with GCS can defend
against poisoning attacks by the PoV scheme and remove the centralization se-
curity challenges by blockchain technology. Furthermore, GCS can compress the
gradient size by 300 times with almost no reduction in accuracy. Therefore, the
proposed BEFL framework is more secure, communication-efficient and practical
in real-world applications.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose BFEL, a scalable, communication-efficient, blockchain-
based framework for federated edge learning. First, we introduce a hierarchical
blockchain framework with multiple blockchains to manage training models and
model trading records in a scalable and flexible way. Second, we propose a Proof-
of-Verifying consensus scheme to defend against poisoning attacks and ensure
reliable federated edge learning. Third, a gradient compression scheme is pre-
sented to reduce communication overhead and achieve communication-efficient
federated edge learning. We evaluate the performance of the proposed frame-
work and schemes on real-world datasets with different typical machine learn-
ing methods. Security analysis and numerical results indicate that the proposed
framework not only ensures secure, scalable federated learning, but also achieves
communication-efficient federated edge learning.
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